by John Stuart Mill (1859)
Chapter I - Introductory
The subject of this Essay is
not the so-called Liberty of the Will, so unfortunately opposed to the
misnamed doctrine of Philosophical Necessity; but Civil, or Social
Liberty: the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately
exercised by society over the individual. A question seldom stated, and
hardly ever discussed, in general terms, but which profoundly
influences the practical controversies of the age by its latent
presence, and is likely soon to make itself recognized as the vital
question of the future. It is so far from being new, that, in a certain
sense, it has divided mankind, almost from the remotest ages, but in
the stage of progress into which the more civilized portions of the
species have now entered, it presents itself under new conditions, and
requires a different and more fundamental treatment. The struggle
between Liberty and Authority is the most conspicuous feature in the
portions of history with which we are earliest familiar, particularly
in that of Greece, Rome, and England. But in old times this contest was
between subjects, or some classes of subjects, and the government.
By liberty, was meant protection against the tyranny of the political
rulers. The rulers were conceived (except in some of the popular
governments of Greece) as in a necessarily antagonistic position to the
people whom they ruled. They consisted of a governing One, or a
governing tribe or caste, who derived their authority from inheritance
or conquest; who, at all events, did not hold it at the pleasure of the
governed, and whose supremacy men did not venture, perhaps did not
desire, to contest, whatever precautions might be taken against its
oppressive exercise. Their power was regarded as necessary, but also as
highly dangerous; as a weapon which they would attempt to use against
their subjects, no less than against external enemies. To prevent the
weaker members of the community from being preyed upon by innumerable
vultures, it was needful that there should be an animal of prey
stronger than the rest, commissioned to keep them down. But as the king
of the vultures would be no less bent upon preying upon the flock than
any of the minor harpies, it was indispensable to be in a perpetual
attitude of defence against his beak and claws. The aim, therefore, of
patriots, was to set limits to the power which the ruler should be
suffered to exercise over the community; and this limitation was what
they meant by liberty. It was attempted in two ways. First, by
obtaining a recognition of certain immunities, called political
liberties or rights, which it was to be regarded as a breach of duty in
the ruler to infringe, and which, if he did infringe, specific
resistance, or general rebellion, was held to be justifiable. A second,
and generally a later expedient, was the establishment of
constitutional checks; by which the consent of the community, or of a
body of some sort supposed to represent its interests, was made a
necessary condition to some of the more important acts of the governing
power. To the first of these modes of limitation, the ruling power, in
most European countries, was compelled, more or less, to submit. It was
not so with the second; and to attain this, or when already in some
degree possessed, to attain it more completely, became everywhere the
principal object of the lovers of liberty. And so long as mankind were
content to combat one enemy by another, and to be ruled by a master, on
condition of being guaranteed more or less efficaciously against his
tyranny, they did not carry their aspirations beyond this point.
A time, however, came in the progress of human affairs, when men ceased
to think it a necessity of nature that their governors should be an
independent power, opposed in interest to themselves. It appeared to
them much better that the various magistrates of the State should be
their tenants or delegates, revocable at their pleasure. In that way
alone, it seemed, could they have complete security that the powers of
government would never be abused to their disadvantage. By degrees,
this new demand for elective and temporary rulers became the prominent
object of the exertions of the popular party, wherever any such party
existed; and superseded, to a considerable extent, the previous efforts
to limit the power of rulers. As the struggle proceeded for making the
ruling power emanate from the periodical choice of the ruled, some
persons began to think that too much importance had been attached to
the limitation of the power itself. That (it might seem) was a resource
against rulers whose interests were habitually opposed to those of the
people. What was now wanted was, that the rulers should be identified
with the people; that their interest and will should be the interest
and will of the nation. The nation did not need to be protected against
its own will. There was no fear of its tyrannizing over itself. Let the
rulers be effectually responsible to it, promptly removable by it, and
it could afford to trust them with power of which it could itself
dictate the use to be made. Their power was but the nation's own power,
concentrated, and in a form convenient for exercise. This mode of
thought, or rather perhaps of feeling, was common among the last
generation of European liberalism, in the Continental section of which,
it still apparently predominates. Those who admit any limit to what a
government may do, except in the case of such governments as they think
ought not to exist, stand out as brilliant exceptions among the
political thinkers of the Continent. A similar tone of sentiment might
by this time have been prevalent in our own country, if the
circumstances which for a time encouraged it had continued unaltered.
But, in political and philosophical theories, as well as in persons,
success discloses faults and infirmities which failure might have
concealed from observation. The notion, that the people have no need to
limit their power over themselves, might seem axiomatic, when popular
government was a thing only dreamed about, or read of as having existed
at some distant period of the past. Neither was that notion necessarily
disturbed by such temporary aberrations as those of the French
Revolution, the worst of which were the work of an usurping few, and
which, in any case, belonged, not to the permanent working of popular
institutions, but to a sudden and convulsive outbreak against
monarchical and aristocratic despotism. In time, however, a democratic
republic came to occupy a large portion of the earth's surface, and
made itself felt as one of the most powerful members of the community
of nations; and elective and responsible government became subject to
the observations and criticisms which wait upon a great existing fact.
It was now perceived that such phrases as "self-government," and "the
power of the people over themselves," do not express the true state of
the case. The "people" who exercise the power, are not always the same
people with those over whom it is exercised, and the "self-government"
spoken of, is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all
the rest. The will of the people, moreover, practically means, the will
of the most numerous or the most active part of the people; the
majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the
majority; the people, consequently, may desire to oppress a part of
their number; and precautions are as much needed against this, as
against any other abuse of power. The limitation, therefore, of the
power of government over individuals, loses none of its importance when
the holders of power are regularly accountable to the community, that
is, to the strongest party therein. This view of things, recommending
itself equally to the intelligence of thinkers and to the inclination
of those important classes in European society to whose real or
supposed interests democracy is adverse, has had no difficulty in
establishing itself; and in political speculations "the tyranny of the
majority" is now generally included among the evils against which
society requires to be on its guard.
Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is
still vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of
the public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when
society is itself the tyran--society collectively, over the separate
individuals who compose it--its means of tyrannizing are not restricted
to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political
functionaries. Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it
issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in
things with which it ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny
more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though
not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of
escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and
enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny
of the magistrate is not enough; there needs protection also against
the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency
of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own
ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them;
to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of
any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all
characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own. There is a
limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with
individual independence; and to find that limit, and maintain it
against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human
affairs, as protection against political despotism.
But though this proposition is not likely to be contested in general
terms, the practical question, where to place the limit--how to make
the fitting adjustment between individual independence and social
control--is a subject on which nearly everything remains to be done.
All that makes existence valuable to any one, depends on the
enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people. Some rules
of conduct, therefore, must be imposed, by law in the first place, and
by opinion on many things which are not fit subjects for the operation
of law. What these rules should be, is the principal question in human
affairs; but if we except a few of the most obvious cases, it is one of
those which least progress has been made in resolving. No two ages, and
scarcely any two countries, have decided it alike; and the decision of
one age or country is a wonder to another. Yet the people of any given
age and country no more suspect any difficulty in it, than if it were a
subject on which mankind had always been agreed. The rules which obtain
among themselves appear to them self-evident and self-justifying. This
all but universal illusion is one of the examples of the magical
influence of custom, which is not only, as the proverb says a second
nature, but is continually mistaken for the first. The effect of
custom, in preventing any misgiving respecting the rules of conduct
which mankind impose on one another, is all the more complete because
the subject is one on which it is not generally considered necessary
that reasons should be given, either by one person to others, or by
each to himself. People are accustomed to believe and have been
encouraged in the belief by some who aspire to the character of
philosophers, that their feelings, on subjects of this nature, are
better than reasons, and render reasons unnecessary. The practical
principle which guides them to their opinions on the regulation of
human conduct, is the feeling in each person's mind that everybody
should be required to act as he, and those with whom he sympathizes,
would like them to act. No one, indeed, acknowledges to himself that
his standard of judgment is his own liking; but an opinion on a point
of conduct, not supported by reasons, can only count as one person's
preference; and if the reasons, when given, are a mere appeal to a
similar preference felt by other people, it is still only many people's
liking instead of one. To an ordinary man, however, his own preference,
thus supported, is not only a perfectly satisfactory reason, but the
only one he generally has for any of his notions of morality, taste, or
propriety, which are not expressly written in his religious creed; and
his chief guide in the interpretation even of that. Men's opinions,
accordingly, on what is laudable or blamable, are affected by all the
multifarious causes which influence their wishes in regard to the
conduct of others, and which are as numerous as those which determine
their wishes on any other subject. Sometimes their reason--at other
times their prejudices or superstitions: often their social affections,
not seldom their anti-social ones, their envy or jealousy, their
arrogance or contemptuousness: but most commonly, their desires or
fears for themselves--their legitimate or illegitimate self-interest.
Wherever there is an ascendant class, a large portion of the morality
of the country emanates from its class interests, and its feelings of
class superiority. The morality between Spartans and Helots, between
planters and negroes, between princes and subjects, between nobles and
roturiers, between men and women, has been for the most part the
creation of these class interests and feelings: and the sentiments thus
generated, react in turn upon the moral feelings of the members of the
ascendant class, in their relations among themselves. Where, on the
other hand, a class, formerly ascendant, has lost its ascendency, or
where its ascendency is unpopular, the prevailing moral sentiments
frequently bear the impress of an impatient dislike of superiority.
Another grand determining principle of the rules of conduct, both in
act and forbearance which have been enforced by law or opinion, has
been the servility of mankind towards the supposed preferences or
aversions of their temporal masters, or of their gods. This servility
though essentially selfish, is not hypocrisy; it gives rise to
perfectly genuine sentiments of abhorrence; it made men burn magicians
and heretics. Among so many baser influences, the general and obvious
interests of society have of course had a share, and a large one, in
the direction of the moral sentiments: less, however, as a matter of
reason, and on their own account, than as a consequence of the
sympathies and antipathies which grew out of them: and sympathies and
antipathies which had little or nothing to do with the interests of
society, have made themselves felt in the establishment of moralities
with quite as great force.
The likings and dislikings of society, or of some powerful portion of
it, are thus the main thing which has practically determined the rules
laid down for general observance, under the penalties of law or
opinion. And in general, those who have been in advance of society in
thought and feeling, have left this condition of things unassailed in
principle, however they may have come into conflict with it in some of
its details. They have occupied themselves rather in inquiring what
things society ought to like or dislike, than in questioning whether
its likings or dislikings should be a law to individuals. They
preferred endeavouring to alter the feelings of mankind on the
particular points on which they were themselves heretical, rather than
make common cause in defence of freedom, with heretics generally. The
only case in which the higher ground has been taken on principle and
maintained with consistency, by any but an individual here and there,
is that of religious belief: a case instructive in many ways, and not
least so as forming a most striking instance of the fallibility of what
is called the moral sense: for the odium theologicum, in a sincere
bigot, is one of the most unequivocal cases of moral feeling. Those who
first broke the yoke of what called itself the Universal Church, were
in general as little willing to permit difference of religious opinion
as that church itself. But when the heat of the conflict was over,
without giving a complete victory to any party, and each church or sect
was reduced to limit its hopes to retaining possession of the ground it
already occupied; minorities, seeing that they had no chance of
becoming majorities, were under the necessity of pleading to those whom
they could not convert, for permission to differ. It is accordingly on
this battle-field, almost solely, that the rights of the individual
against society have been asserted on broad grounds of principle, and
the claim of society to exercise authority over dissentients openly
controverted. The great writers to whom the world owes what religious
liberty it possesses, have mostly asserted freedom of conscience as an
indefeasible right, and denied absolutely that a human being is
accountable to others for his religious belief. Yet so natural to
mankind is intolerance in whatever they really care about, that
religious freedom has hardly anywhere been practically realized, except
where religious indifference, which dislikes to have its peace
disturbed by theological quarrels, has added its weight to the scale.
In the minds of almost all religious persons, even in the most tolerant
countries, the duty of toleration is admitted with tacit reserves. One
person will bear with dissent in matters of church government, but not
of dogma; another can tolerate everybody, short of a Papist or an
Unitarian; another, every one who believes in revealed religion; a few
extend their charity a little further, but stop at the belief in a God
and in a future state. Wherever the sentiment of the majority is still
genuine and intense, it is found to have abated little of its claim to
be obeyed.
In England, from the peculiar circumstances of our political history,
though the yoke of opinion is perhaps heavier, that of law is lighter,
than in most other countries of Europe; and there is considerable
jealousy of direct interference, by the legislative or the executive
power with private conduct; not so much from any just regard for the
independence of the individual, as from the still subsisting habit of
looking on the government as representing an opposite interest to the
public. The majority have not yet learnt to feel the power of the
government their power, or its opinions their opinions. When they do
so, individual liberty will probably be as much exposed to invasion
from the government, as it already is from public opinion. But, as yet,
there is a considerable amount of feeling ready to be called forth
against any attempt of the law to control individuals in things in
which they have not hitherto been accustomed to be controlled by it;
and this with very little discrimination as to whether the matter is,
or is not, within the legitimate sphere of legal control; insomuch that
the feeling, highly salutary on the whole, is perhaps quite as often
misplaced as well grounded in the particular instances of its
application.
There is, in fact, no recognized principle by which the propriety or
impropriety of government interference is customarily tested. People
decide according to their personal preferences. Some, whenever they see
any good to be done, or evil to be remedied, would willingly instigate
the government to undertake the business; while others prefer to bear
almost any amount of social evil, rather than add one to the
departments of human interests amenable to governmental control. And
men range themselves on one or the other side in any particular case,
according to this general direction of their sentiments; or according
to the degree of interest which they feel in the particular thing which
it is proposed that the government should do; or according to the
belief they entertain that the government would, or would not, do it in
the manner they prefer; but very rarely on account of any opinion to
which they consistently adhere, as to what things are fit to be done by
a government. And it seems to me that, in consequence of this absence
of rule or principle, one side is at present as often wrong as the
other; the interference of government is, with about equal frequency,
improperly invoked and improperly condemned.
The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as
entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the
individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used
be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion
of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which
mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in interfering with
the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm
to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient
warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it
will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier,
because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even
right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning
with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling
him, or visiting him with any evil, in case he do otherwise. To justify
that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be
calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the
conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which
concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his
independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body
and mind, the individual is sovereign.
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to
apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are
not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which the
law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a
state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected
against their own actions as well as against external injury. For the
same reason, we may leave out of consideration those backward states of
society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage.
The early difficulties in the way of spontaneous progress are so great,
that there is seldom any choice of means for overcoming them; and a
ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any
expedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable.
Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with
barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means
justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has
no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind
have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion.
Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an
Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one. But as
soon as mankind have attained the capacity of being guided to their own
improvement by conviction or persuasion (a period long since reached in
all nations with whom we need here concern ourselves), compulsion,
either in the direct form or in that of pains and penalties for
non-compliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their own good,
and justifiable only for the security of others.
It is proper to state that I forego any advantage which could be
derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right as a thing
independent of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all
ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense,
grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being.
Those interests, I contend, authorize the subjection of individual
spontaneity to external control, only in respect to those actions of
each, which concern the interest of other people. If any one does an
act hurtful to others, there is a prima facie case for punishing him,
by law, or, where legal penalties are not safely applicable, by general
disapprobation. There are also many positive acts for the benefit of
others, which he may rightfully be compelled to perform; such as, to
give evidence in a court of justice; to bear his fair share in the
common defence, or in any other joint work necessary to the interest of
the society of which he enjoys the protection; and to perform certain
acts of individual beneficence, such as saving a fellow-creature's
life, or interposing to protect the defenceless against ill-usage,
things which whenever it is obviously a man's duty to do, he may
rightfully be made responsible to society for not doing. A person may
cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and
in neither case he is justly accountable to them for the injury. The
latter case, it is true, requires a much more cautious exercise of
compulsion than the former. To make any one answerable for doing evil
to others, is the rule; to make him answerable for not preventing evil,
is, comparatively speaking, the exception. Yet there are many cases
clear enough and grave enough to justify that exception. In all things
which regard the external relations of the individual, he is de jure
amenable to those whose interests are concerned, and if need be, to
society as their protector. There are often good reasons for not
holding him to the responsibility; but these reasons must arise from
the special expediencies of the case: either because it is a kind of
case in which he is on the whole likely to act better, when left to his
own discretion, than when controlled in any way in which society have
it in their power to control him; or because the attempt to exercise
control would produce other evils, greater than those which it would
prevent. When such reasons as these preclude the enforcement of
responsibility, the conscience of the agent himself should step into
the vacant judgment-seat, and protect those interests of others which
have no external protection; judging himself all the more rigidly,
because the case does not admit of his being made accountable to the
judgment of his fellow-creatures.
But there is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from
the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending
all that portion of a person's life and conduct which affects only
himself, or, if it also affects others, only with their free,
voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation. When I say only
himself, I mean directly, and in the first instance: for whatever
affects himself, may affect others through himself; and the objection
which may be grounded on this contingency, will receive consideration
in the sequel. This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty.
It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding
liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of
thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all
subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological.
The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall
under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the
conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, being almost
of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in
great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it.
Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of
framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we
like, subject to such consequences as may follow; without impediment
from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them
even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong.
Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty,
within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to
unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons
combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived.
No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected,
is free, whatever may be its form of government; and none is completely
free in which they do not exist absolute and unqualified. The only
freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in
our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs,
or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of
his own health, whether bodily, or mental or spiritual. Mankind are
greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to
themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.
Though this doctrine is anything but new, and, to some persons, may
have the air of a truism, there is no doctrine which stands more
directly opposed to the general tendency of existing opinion and
practice. Society has expended fully as much effort in the attempt
(according to its lights) to compel people to conform to its notions of
personal, as of social excellence. The ancient commonwealths thought
themselves entitled to practise, and the ancient philosophers
countenanced, the regulation of every part of private conduct by public
authority, on the ground that the State had a deep interest in the
whole bodily and mental discipline of every one of its citizens, a mode
of thinking which may have been admissible in small republics
surrounded by powerful enemies, in constant peril of being subverted by
foreign attack or internal commotion, and to which even a short
interval of relaxed energy and self-command might so easily be fatal,
that they could not afford to wait for the salutary permanent effects
of freedom. In the modern world, the greater size of political
communities, and above all, the separation between the spiritual and
temporal authority (which placed the direction of men's consciences in
other hands than those which controlled their worldly affairs),
prevented so great an interference by law in the details of private
life; but the engines of moral repression have been wielded more
strenuously against divergence from the reigning opinion in
self-regarding, than even in social matters; religion, the most
powerful of the elements which have entered into the formation of moral
feeling, having almost always been governed either by the ambition of a
hierarchy, seeking control over every department of human conduct, or
by the spirit of Puritanism. And some of those modern reformers who
have placed themselves in strongest opposition to the religions of the
past, have been nowhere behind either churches or sects in their
assertion of the right of spiritual domination: M. Compte, in
particular, whose social system, as unfolded in his Trait de Politique
Positive, aims at establishing (though by moral more than by legal
appliances) a despotism of society over the individual, surpassing
anything contemplated in the political ideal of the most rigid
disciplinarian among the ancient philosophers.
Apart from the peculiar tenets of individual thinkers, there is also in
the world at large an increasing inclination to stretch unduly the
powers of society over the individual, both by the force of opinion and
even by that of legislation: and as the tendency of all the changes
taking place in the world is to strengthen society, and diminish the
power of the individual, this encroachment is not one of the evils
which tend spontaneously to disappear, but, on the contrary, to grow
more and more formidable. The disposition of mankind, whether as rulers
or as fellow-citizens, to impose their own opinions and inclinations as
a rule of conduct on others, is so energetically supported by some of
the best and by some of the worst feelings incident to human nature,
that it is hardly ever kept under restraint by anything but want of
power; and as the power is not declining, but growing, unless a strong
barrier of moral conviction can be raised against the mischief, we must
expect, in the present circumstances of the world, to see it increase.
It will be convenient for the argument, if, instead of at once entering
upon the general thesis, we confine ourselves in the first instance to
a single branch of it, on which the principle here stated is, if not
fully, yet to a certain point, recognized by the current opinions. This
one branch is the Liberty of Thought: from which it is impossible to
separate the cognate liberty of speaking and of writing. Although these
liberties, to some considerable amount, form part of the political
morality of all countries which profess religious toleration and free
institutions, the grounds, both philosophical and practical, on which
they rest, are perhaps not so familiar to the general mind, nor so
thoroughly appreciated by many even of the leaders of opinion, as might
have been expected. Those grounds, when rightly understood, are of much
wider application than to only one division of the subject, and a
thorough consideration of this part of the question will be found the
best introduction to the remainder. Those to whom nothing which I am
about to say will be new, may therefore, I hope, excuse me, if on a
subject which for now three centuries has been so often discussed, I
venture on one discussion more.